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Abstract 
The question addressed in this paper is: If we present to a user an AI system that 
explains how it works, how do we know whether the explanation works and the 
user has achieved a pragmatic understanding of the AI? In other words, how do 
we know that an explanainable AI system (XAI) is any good? Our focus is on the 
key concepts of measurement. We discuss specific methods for evaluating: (1) the 
goodness of explanations, (2) whether users are satisfied by explanations, (3) how 
well users understand the AI systems, (4) how curiosity motivates the search for 
explanations, (5) whether the user's trust and reliance on the AI are appropriate, 
and finally, (6) how the human-XAI work system performs. The 
recommendations we present derive from our integration of extensive research 
literatures and our own psychometric evaluations. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
For decision makers who rely upon Artificial Intelligence (AI), analytics and data science, 
explainability is an issue. If a computational system relies on a simple statistical model, decision 
makers can understand it and convince executives who have to sign off on a system that it is 
reasonable and that seems fair. They can justify the analytical results to shareholders, regulators, 
etc.  But for Machine Learning and Deep Net systems, they can no longer do this. There is a need 
for ways to explain the computational system to the decision maker so that they know that their 
full process is going to be reasonable.  
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... current efforts face unprecedented difficulties: contemporary models are more 
complex and less interpretable than ever; [AI is] used for a wider array of tasks, 
and are more pervasive in everyday life than in the past; and [AI is] increasingly 
allowed to make (and take) more autonomous decisions (and actions). Justifying 
these decisions will only become more crucial, and there is little doubt that this 
field will continue to rise in prominence and produce exciting and much needed 
work in the future (Biran and Cotton, 2017, p. 4). 
 
This quotation brings into relief the importance of "Explainable AI" (XAI.) A proposed 
regulation before the European Union (Goodman and Flaxman, 2016) prohibits "automatic 
processing" unless user's rights are safeguarded. Users have a "right to an explanation" 
concerning algorithm-created decisions that are based on personal information. Future laws may 
restrict AI, which represents a challenge to industry. 
 
Expert Systems researchers have previously implemented methods for explanation (Clancey, 
1984, 1986; McKeown & Swartout, 1987; Moore & Swartout, 1990). In a sense, explanation is 
what and Intelligent Tutoring Systems were (and are) all about (Forbus & Feltovich, 2001; 
Poulson & Richardson, 1988; Psotka,  Massey & Mutter, 1988; Ritter & Feurzeig, 1988; 
Sleeman & Brown, 1982). AI systems are receiving considerable attention in the recent popular 
press (Alang, 2017; Bornstein, 2016; Champlin, Bell & Schocken, 2017; Harford, 2014; 
Hawkins, 2017; Kuang, 2017; Pavlus, 2017; Pinker, 2017; Schwiep, 2017; Voosen, 2017; 
Weinberger, 2017). Reporting and opinion pieces have discussed social justice, equity, and 
fairness issues that are implicated by AI (e.g., Felten, 2017).  
 
The goals of explanation involve answering questions such as, "How does it work?" and "What 
mistakes can it make?" and “Why did it just do that?” The question addressed in this paper is: If 
we present to a user an AI system that explains how it works, how do we go about measuring 
whether or not it works, whether it works well, and whether the user has achieved a pragmatic 
understanding? Our focus in this paper is on the key concepts of measurement for the evaluation 
of XAI systems and human-machine performance.  
 
1.1 Key Measurement Concepts 
 
The concept or process of explanation or understanding has been explored in one way or another 
by scholars and scientists of all schools and specializations, spanning all of human civilization.  
To say that the pertinent literature is enormous is an understatement. In modern times, the 
concept is a focus in Philosophy of Science, Psychology (Cognitive, Developmental, Social, 
Organizational), Education and Training, Team Science, and Human Factors.  
 
While explainable AI is only now gaining widespread visibility, [there is a] 
continuous history of work on explanation and can provide a pool of ideas for 
researchers currently tackling the task of explanation (Biran and Cotton, 2017, p. 
4).  
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Key concepts include causal reasoning and abductive inference, comprehension of complex 
systems, counterfactual reasoning, and contrastive reasoning. For reviews of the literature, see 
Miller (2017) and Hoffman, Klein and Mueller (2018). 
 
A conceptual model of the XAI explaining process is presented in Figure 1. This diagram 
highlights four major classes of measures. Initial instruction in how to use an AI system will 
enable the user to form an initial mental model of the task and the AI system. Subsequent 
experience, which can include system-generated explanations, would enable to participant to 
refine their mental model, which should lead to better performance and appropriate trust and 
reliance. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  A conceptual model of the process of explaining, in the XAI context. 
 
 
By hypothesis, explanations that are good and are satisfying to users enable users to develop a 
good mental model. In turn, their good mental model will enable them to develop appropriate 
trust in the AI and perform well when using the AI. To evaluate this model of the explanation 
process, a number of types of measures are required (Miller, 2017). In the remainder of this 
report we detail each of the four classes of measures and offer specific methodological 
suggestions. 
 
 
2 Explanation Goodness and Satisfaction 
 
The property of "being an explanation" is not a property of statements, it is an interaction. What 
counts as an explanation depends on what the learner/user needs, what knowledge the user 
(learner) already has, and especially the user's goals. This leads to a consideration of function 
and context of the AI system (software, algorithm, tool), That is, why does a given user need an 
XAI	Metrics		 	 p.	4	
explanation? In the various pertinent literatures, this is expressed in terms of the different kinds 
of questions that a user might have. These “triggers” for explanation are listed in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Triggers and goals. 
 
 
TRIGGERS 
 
 
USER/LEARNER’S GOAL 
How do I use it?  Achieve the primary ask goals 
How does it work? Feeling of satisfaction at having achieved an 
understanding of the system, in general (global 
understanding) 
What did it just do? Feeling of satisfaction at having achieved a 
understanding of how the system made a particular 
decision (local understanding) 
What does it achieve? Understanding of the system's functions and uses 
What will it do next? Feeling of trust based on the observability and 
predictability of the system 
How much effort will this take? Feeling of effectiveness and achievement of the 
primary task goals 
What do I do if it gets it wrong? Desire to avoid mistakes 
How do I avoid the failure modes? Desire to mitigate errors 
What would it have done if x were 
different? 
Resolution of curiosity at having achieved an 
understanding of the system 
Why didn’t it do z? Resolution of curiosity at having achieved an 
understanding of the local decision 
 
Thus, the seeking of an explanation can tacitly be an expression of a need for a certain kind of 
explanation, to satisfy certain user purposes of user goals.  
 
 
2.1 Explanation Goodness 
Looking across the scholastic and research literatures on explanation, we find assertions about 
what makes for a good explanation, from the standpoint of statements as explanations,. There is a 
general consensus on this; factors such as clarity and precision. Thus, one can look at a given 
explanation and make an a priori (or decontextualized) judgment as to whether or not it is 
"good." Appendix A presents a Goodness Checklist that can be used by XAI researchers to either 
try and design goodness into the explanations that their XAI system generates, or to evaluate the 
a priori goodness of the explanations that an XAI system generates. In a proper experiment, the 
researchers who complete the checklist, with reference to some particular AI-generated 
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explanation, would not be the ones who created the XAI system under study. Using the 
Goodness checklist, those independent judges ask, Are the researchers right in claiming that their 
explanations are good? 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Explanation Satisfaction 
 
While an explanation might be deemed good in the manner described above, it may at the same 
time not be adequate or satisfying to users-in-context. Explanation Satisfaction is defined as the 
degree to which users feel that they understand the AI system or process being explained to 
them. Compared to Goodness, as we defined it above, satisfaction is a contextualized, a 
posteriori judgment of explanations.  
 
Based on our review of the psychological literature on explanation, including theoretical and 
empirical work by Muir (1987, 1994) and by Cahour and Forzy (2009), we identified several key 
attributes of explanations: understandability, feeling of satisfaction, sufficiency of detail, 
completeness, usefulness, accuracy, and trustworthiness. These terms were incorporated into an 
initial pool of Likert scale items that we constructed for review and evaluation.  
 
Standard practice in psychometrics involves assuring that a scale is internally consistent or 
reliable (evaluated primarily by the method of Cronbach's alpha, which is based on inter-item 
covariance). For the XAI context, it is immediate importance to determine the validity of an 
Explanation Satisfaction scale. 
 
 
2.3 Scale Validation: Content Validity 
 
Psychometric theory describes several methods for evaluating validity, all of which ultimately 
refer to the question, Does the scale measure what it is intended to measure? Two distinct kinds 
of validity are immediately pertinent to the development of a scale of Explanation Satisfaction. 
These are described in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Types of validity that are immediately pertinent to an evaluation of the Satisfaction Scale. 
 
Surface (i.e., “face”) Validity  
 
This is a judgment that the items appear to measure what they are intended to measure because they refer 
literally and explicitly to the conceptual measurables that the instrument is supposed to measure. For 
example, a questionnaire item that asks you to rate how smart you think you are compared to the average 
person would have surface validity as a measure of self-perceived intelligence since it refers explicitly to 
the concept of intelligence, and asks for a rating that treats intelligence as a scalar variable. (Setting aside 
for now the fact that the rating might be biased.) 
Construct Validity 
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Construct validity is the analysis of the test in terms of some theoretical framework, or the reliance on an 
accepted theoretical framework in the construction of the test and the individual items. "[It] reflects the 
degree to which the measurement instrument spans the domain of the construct’s theoretical definition; it 
is the extent to which a measurement instrument captures the different facets of a construct" 
(Rungtusanatham, 1998, p.10). Thus, the measurements fall on a measurement scale that is interpreted as 
a measure of the theoretical concept (Hoffman, 2010). 
 
These aspects of validity can be evaluated by having domain experts make judgments as to 
whether the scale items are meaningful and measurable indicators of the relevant psychological 
construct, and consistent with the accepted theoretical framework for the construct. We 
conducted a validation study with the cooperation of participants and attendees at a recent 
DARPA-sponsored meeting of XAI researchers. The participants could express their judgments 
by rating the degree to which each scale item is essential to measuring the construct. 
 
Participants were asked to evaluate the scale using the Content Validity Ratio (CVR) method 
(Lawshe, 1975). The CVR is useful for quantitatively assessing the strength of each scale item 
with a small group of raters. The scale that was presented to participants is presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. The CVR version of the Explanation Satisfaction scale. 
 
For each item listed below, please indicate whether you believe that the item is:  
• Essential for measuring Explanation Satisfaction,  
• Useful but not Essential, or  
• Not Necessary for measuring Explanation Satisfaction.  
 
Indicate your response by circling the appropriate number. 
  Essential Useful but 
not essential 
Not 
Necessary 
1. I understand this explanation of how the [software, 
algorithm, tool] works. 
1 2 3 
2. This explanation of how the [software, algorithm, tool] 
works is satisfying. 
1 2 3 
3. This explanation of how the [software, algorithm, tool] 
works has sufficient detail. 
1 2 3 
4. This explanation of how the [software, algorithm, tool] 
works contains irrelevant details. 
1 2 3 
5. This explanation of how the [software, algorithm, tool] 
works seems complete. 
1 2 3 
6. This explanation of how the [software, algorithm, tool] 
works tells me how to use it. 
1 2 3 
7. This explanation of how the [software, algorithm, tool] 
works is useful to my goals. 
1 2 3 
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8. This explanation of says how accurate the [software, 
algorithm, tool] is. 
1 2 3 
9. This explanation lets me judge when I should trust and 
not trust the [software, algorithm, tool] 
1 2 3 
 
In order to get reasonably stable psychometric estimates for evaluating the items' communality, a 
rule of thumb (in the psychometric literature) is that one wants 5-10 respondents. At the DARPA 
PI meeting we received responses from 35 domain practitioners. 
 
Six of the participants identified as software engineers, four self-identified as graduate students 
(primarily in computer science or engineering), one as a test pilot, and three did not specify their 
profession. Fifteen individuals self-identified as computer scientists (Ph.D. and BS/MS degrees). 
Three participants self-identified as psychologists. The remaining 21 participants self-identified 
as researchers, professors, or research managers (fields including computer science, engineering, 
psychology, and mathematics). 
 
In keeping with recommendations on using the CVR method for item selection (Davis, 1992; 
Gilbert & Prion, 2016; Lynn, 1986), items that are rated as either "essential" or "useful" by more 
than 50% of the professionals were selected for further analysis; items that did not meet this 
criteria were dropped from further consideration. For each selected item, the CVR was calculated 
by dividing the number of respondents who rated the item as "essential" or "useful" to the total 
number of participants.  CVR ratios are calculated for each item separately, by dividing the 
number of raters who rated an item as either "essential" or "useful" to the total number of 
participants. The resulting ratio values for all scale items are aggregated and transformed to a 
scale that ranges between −1 (perfect disagreement) and +1 (perfect agreement), with CVR 
values above zero indicating that over half of our domain professionals judged the item to be a 
highly valid indicator of ES as a psychological construct. 
 
The average CVR for all participants who self-identified as having Ph.D. degrees was 0.43. The 
CVR for the computer scientists was 0.60. The average CVR for the self-identified 
"Researchers" was 0.43, and for "Others" was 0.57. According to Ayre and Scally (2014) the 
Critical Value of the average CVR should be 0.50 or greater. Given our relatively large sample 
size, we take our results (positive CVRs in the range of 0.43 to 0.60) to indicate reasonably high 
agreement as to the validity of the scale items. 
 
Many participants reported that they found item number 4 to be confusing. This is the only item 
that would be reverse scored (i.e., an explanation would be unsatisfying if it contained irrelevant 
details). For this reason, we recalculated the Critical Values after dropping this scale item. All 
other items were rated as either "Essential" or "Useful" measures of Explanation Satisfaction. It 
is interesting to note the Computer Scientists and Electrical Engineers collectively showed higher 
agreement than the Psychologists. This seems to be due to the high ratings given to scale item 
number 7 by the individuals who self-identified as psychologists. They appear to have been 
emphasizing the importance of the goal relevance of explanations. 
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We assessed the internal consistency of the ES scale. Cronbach's alpha was 0.86; ES items had 
item-total correlations ranging from 0.41 to 0.76 and an average inter-item correlation of 0.71, 
indicative of excellent internal consistency reliability, especially for such a brief scale that is 
very easy to administer and score (Comrey, 1988; Cortina, 1993; Streiner, 2003). 
 
 
 
2.4 Scale Validation: Discriminant Validity 
 
Our next step was to test the discriminant validity of the ES scale, that is, does it differentiate 
between relatively good and poor explanations. The scale resulting from the CVR analysis was 
subjected to analysis of its discriminant validity using three test cases (How does a cruise control 
work? How do computers predict hurricanes? How do cell phones find directions?). For each test 
case, a small group of experts were employed to generate what they felt were "good" 
explanations, and the researchers themselves developed what they felt were "bad" versions. The 
"bad" versions were sparse, had irrelevant details, and some incorrect statements. The materials 
are presented in Appendix B. 
Eight volunteers (students and junior researchers at IHMC) were asked to use the Explanation 
Satisfaction Scale to rate “good” and “bad” explanations. We calculated a 2 (Explanation 
Quality: “Good” vs. “Bad”) x 2 (Object to be explained) mixed model ANOVA, for which the 
scale ratings were treated as a repeated measure. The main effect for ratings of Explanation 
Quality was only marginally significant [F (1,6) = .455; p < .08], but the size of the effect was 
quite large (Cohen’s d = 1.5, equivalent to a r2 = .36) indicating that, in general, scale ratings 
corresponded to higher values being awarded to good explanations (M = 42.75; SD = 3.40) and 
lower values being given for bad explanations (M = 30.00; SD = 11.46). No statistically 
significant effect was found for giving repeated scale ratings or for the interaction with 
Explanation Quality. 
In conclusion, results from the content validity analysis and discriminant validity analysis show 
that the ES scale is valid. The Explanation Satisfaction Scale is presented in Appendix C. Like 
the Explanation Goodness Checklist (Appendix A), the Explanation Satisfaction Scale was based 
on the literatures in cognitive psychology, philosophy of science, and other pertinent disciplines 
regarding the features that make explanations good. Thus, the Explanation Satisfaction Scale is 
very similar to the Explanation Goodness Checklist. However, the application context for the 
two scales is quite different. 
• The Explanation Goodness Checklist is intended to be used by researchers or their XAI 
systems that have created explanations. The Explanation Goodness Checklist is intended 
for use as an independent evaluation of explanations by other researchers. The reference 
is to the properties of explanations.  
• Explanation Satisfaction is an evaluation of explanations by users. The Explanation 
Satisfaction Scale is for collecting judgments by research participants after they have 
worked with the XAI system that is being explained, and have been the beneficiaries of 
one or more explanations. 
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3. Measuring Mental Models 
 
A methodology is needed for eliciting, representing, and analyzing users' mental models of 
intelligent systems or decision aid systems. In cognitive psychology, "mental models" are 
representations or expressions of how a person understands some sort of event, process, or 
system (Klein and Hoffman, 2008). In the XAI context, a mental model is basically a user’s 
understanding of the AI system.  
 
3.1 Users' Models of the Computer ("Mental Models") versus the Computer's 
Models of Users ("User Models") 
 
In current parlance, the user's "mental model" is distinguished from what is called a "user 
model." The latter is a computer model of a user's mental model. The AI employs user models to 
adapt its operations and interactions. User models might consist of formalisms, such as 
production rules and semantic networks, which may represent a person’s preferences and 
emulate some aspects of his or her knowledge and reasoning about some situation. User models 
for intelligent tutoring systems were aimed at understanding a learner's understanding so as to 
tailor instructional materials and exercises (see for instance, Lesgold, et al., 1992). User models 
are also referenced in the design of human-machine systems (see for instance, Carberry, 1990; 
Harris and Helander, 1984; May, Barnard, and Blandford, 1993). User models for AI and expert 
systems were aimed at emulating human cognition and thereby replicating performance on 
various tasks (see for instance, Anderson et al., 1990; Clancey, 1984, 1986). Mental models, 
including the person’s beliefs and conceptual processes, may be represented as computational 
cognitive models using similar formalisms.  
 
In this report, we do not review attempts to automatically generate user models (that is, formal 
instantiations of mental models). Friedman, Forbus and Sherin (2017) present present a 
computational cognitive model that creates and evaluates models based on fragmentary and 
inconsistent information. Their formalism is predicate calculus, and the assertion is that the 
system is capable of abductive inference, that is, inference to a best explanation. Our focus is on 
methods for eliciting information about users' mental models. 
 
3.2 Empirical Assertions 
 
There is a large body of research by experimental psychologists on mental models (e.g., Carroll, 
1984; Gentner and Gentner, 1983; Greeno, 1977; Johnson-Laird, 1980, 1989; Kintsch, Miller & 
Poulson, 1974). Praetorious and Duncan (1988) present an elegant treatment of methodology for 
eliciting mental models. Staggers and Norco (1992) provide a good summary of the conceptual 
and theoretical issues.  
 
There is a consensus that mental models can be inferred from empirical evidence. People may 
not be able to tell you “everything” about their understanding, and they may not be able to tell it 
well.  But with adequate scaffolding by some method of guided task reflection, people can tell 
you how they understand an event or system, they can describe their knowledge of it, and the 
concepts and principles that are involved. There is sufficient evidence to conclude that different 
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methods for eliciting mental models can converge (Evans, et al., 2001; van der Veer, & 
Melguzio, 2003). 
 
For many people, mental imagery is involved in reasoning and dynamical and complex systems 
(e.g., Bogacz & Trafton, 2004). This assertion is supported by studies showing that diagrams can 
contribute significantly to the understanding of dynamic and complex systems (e.g., Clement, 
2004; Glenberg and Langston, 1992; Heiser & Tversky, 2004; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Klein & 
Hoffman, 2008; Qin & Simon, 1992; Zhang & Wickens, 1987). 
 
These ideas pertain directly to how people understand machines, spanning simple devices, 
process control systems, complex computational systems, and intelligent systems (Bainbridge, 
1979, 1988; de Kleer and Brown, 1983; Goodstein, Andersen and Olsen, 1988; Moray, 1987; 
Mueller & Klein, 2011; Rasmussen, 1986; Rasmussen,  Pejtersen, & Goodstein,  1994; 
Samurcay and Hoc, 1996; Staggers and Norcio, 1993; Williams, Hollan, and Stevens, 1983; 
Young, 1983). 
 
 
3.3 Overview of Mental Model Elicitation Methods 
 
Referring again to the historical differences between concepts of user models, cognitive models, 
and mental models, there are associated differences in how models of human cognition are 
elicited and represented. There are also differences in the emphasis placed on elicitation 
methods. For example, some of the work on user and cognitive models focuses on formal 
methods and languages for modeling beliefs and/or problem solving (e.g., procedural rules), 
These are researchers’ computational models of what a user’s mental model might be (see for 
instance, Clancey, 1986; Johnson-Laird, 1983; de Kleer, Doyle, Steele, and Sussman, 1977; 
Doyle, et al., 2002; Moray, 1983; Schaffernicht and Groesser, 2011).  
 
Table 4 lists some methods that have been used to elicit mental models in fields such as 
cognitive psychology, knowledge acquisition for expert systems, instructional design, and 
educational computing. Table 5 lists some strengths and weaknesses of various methods. 
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Table 4. Some methods that can be used to elicit mental models. 
 
METHOD ILLUSTRATIVE REFERENCES 
 
Think-Aloud Problem Solving Task, in which 
participants think aloud during a task.   
Reports by Pjtersen and Goodstein (1994) and 
Williams, Hollan and Stevens, (1983) are good 
illustrations of the task to elicit mental models 
specifically of devices. See also Beach, 1992; 
Ericsson and Simon, 1984; Gentner and Stevens, 
1983; Greeno, 1983; Rasmussen, Pejtersen & 
Goodstein, 1994; Ward, et al., in press. 
Think-Aloud Task with Concurrent Question 
Answering. 
Gentner and Gentner, 1983; Williams, Hollan and 
Stevens, 1983 
Task Reflection or Retrospection Task, in which 
participants describe their reasoning after 
conducting a task (e.g., fault diagnosis). The 
retrospection can be based, for example, on a replay 
of their task performance such as in a video. 
Fryer (1939) provides a clear and succinct 
presentation of a method that combines 
retrospection with Likert scale questionnaire to 
quantify participants’ reasoning.  See also 
Frederick, 2005; Lippa, Klein & Shalin, 2008; 
Praetorious & Duncan, 1988 
Structured interview, essentially Retrospection 
Task with Question-Answering. 
Friedman, Forbus & Sherin, 2017; Fryer, 1939 
Card Sorting Task (also "Pathfinder"), based on the 
semantic similarity among a set of domain 
concepts. 
The review article by van der Veer & Melguzio 
(2003) highlights this method. See also Chi, 
Feltovich & Glaser, 1981; St.-Cyr and Burns, 
2002; Evans, et al., 2001; van der Veer & 
Melguzio, 2003 
Nearest Neighbor Task, in which participants select 
the explanation or diagram that best fits their 
beliefs. 
Hardiman, Dufresne and Mestre, 1989; Klein and 
Militello, 2001 
Self-Explanation Task (also called "Teach-back"), 
in which the user/learner expresses their own 
understanding. Similar to the 
Retrospection/Reflection Task 
Cañas et al., 2003; Ford, Cañas, & Coffey, 1993; 
Fermbach, et al., 2010; Molinaro & Garcia-
Madruga, 2011; van der Veer & Melguzio, 2003 
Glitch Detector Task (also called “accident-error 
analysis”), in which people identify the things that 
are wrong in an explanation.  
Hoffman, Coffey, Ford & Carnot, 2001; Taylor, 
1988 
Prediction Task, in which users are presented test 
cases and are asked users to predict the results and 
then explain why they thought the predicted results 
would obtain. 
Muramatsu & Pratt, 2001 
Diagramming Task (also "Concept Mapping"), in 
which users create a diagram that lays out their 
knowledge of processes, events and other relations. 
Cañas, et al., 2003; Evans, et al., 2001; Hoffman 
et al., 2017; Moon, et al., 2011; Novak & Gowin, 
1984 
ShadowBox Task, in which learners compare their 
understandings to those of a domain expert. 
Klein & Borders, 2016 
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Table 5.  Methods strengths and weaknesses. 
 
METHOD STRENGTH WEAKNESS 
 
Concurrent Think-
Aloud Problem 
Solving 
Can provide rich information about 
mental models. 
Transcription and protocol analysis can 
be time consuming, result in a great 
deal of data, require much analysis. 
Think-Aloud Task 
with Concurrent 
Question Answering 
Enables the researcher to present 
targeted probes to the user during task 
performance. 
Highly dependent on the 
researcher/interviewer’s skill at 
question design and interviewing. 
Task Reflection or 
Retrospection 
Can be conducted as a structured 
interview, as a questionnaire task, or as 
a post-task verbalization of a self-
explanation. Can provide rich 
information about mental models, or a 
quick window into mental models. The 
process of self-explanation itself has 
learning value. 
People can overestimate how well they 
understand complex systems. 
Transcription and protocol analysis can 
be time consuming, result in a great 
deal of data, require much analysis. 
Less effort would be required in a 
questionnaire method, though 
questionnaire design would be non-
trivial. 
Card Sorting Can provide information about domain 
concepts and their relations. 
Can provide sparse data about events 
or processes. 
Primary data consists only of similarity 
ratings (i.e., semantic nets) 
Nearest Neighbor Can provide a quick window into 
mental models. 
People overestimate how well they 
understand complex systems. 
Glitch Detector Can support users to discover and 
explain aspects of their mental model 
that are reductive or incorrect. 
Glitches have to be built-in. 
Knowledge shields may inhibit the 
awareness of reductive tendencies. 
Question-
Answering/Structured 
Interview 
Enables researcher to probe selected 
aspects of a user’s mental model. 
Highly dependent on the 
researcher/interviewer’s skill at 
question design and interviewing. 
Prediction Task Can provide a quick window into 
mental models.  The predictions should 
be accompanied by a confidence rating 
and an free response elaboration that 
explains or justifies the predictions. 
The free responses require content 
analysis. Requires clear rationale for 
the choice of instances or cases to be 
the focus of the predictions. 
Diagramming Task Can provide a rich and thorough 
representation of the user’s mental 
model.  Relations are not restricted to 
similarity (see Card Sorting Task, 
above). 
Can take time to create, although user 
friendly software systems are readily 
available. 
 Box or "Shadowbox 
Lite" Task 
Can provide a quick window into 
mental models. 
May not result in a thorough 
expression of the mental model. 
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3.4 Application to the XAI Context 
 
What is most desirable for XAI is a task that enables the researcher to learn what is good and 
what is not good about a user's mental model, and enable the learner to learn what is good and 
what is limited in their understanding. An insight can be thought of as the self-awareness of a 
"knowledge shield" (Feltovich, Coulson, and Spiro, 2001). Knowledge shields are arguments 
that learners make that enable them to preserve their reductive understandings. A focus for 
instructional design has been to develop methods to get people to recognize when they are 
employing a knowledge shield that prevents them from developing richer mental models (Hilton, 
1986, 1996; Prietula, Feltovich, & Marchak, 2000; Schaffernicht & Groesser, 2011; Tullio, Dey, 
Chalecki, & Fogarty, 2007). 
 
What is most desirable for XAI is a method that can elicit mental models quickly, and result in 
data that can be easily scored, categorized, or analyzed.    
 
It is important that the method provide some sort of structure or “scaffolding” that supports the 
user in explaining their thoughts and reasoning. One method is Cued Retrospection. Probe 
questions are presented to participants about their reasoning just after the reasoning task has been 
performed (see Ward, et al, in press). For instance, they might be asked, "Can you describe the 
major components or steps in the [software system, algorithm]." The probes can also reference 
metacognitive processes, for example by asking, "Based on the explanation of the [software, 
algorithm], can you imagine circumstances or situations in which the [software, algorithm] might 
lead to error conditions, wrong answers, or bad decisions?"  
 
Instances of explanation are often expressions of what will happen in the future (Koehler, 1991; 
Lombrozo and Carey, 2006; Mitchell, Russo & Pennington, 1989). Prediction Tasks have the 
user predict what the AI will do, such as the classification of images by a Deep Net. A prediction 
task might be about "What do you think will happen next? but it can also be about "Why 
wouldn't something else happen?"  Explanation and counterfactual reasoning are co-implicative. 
Instances of explanation often are expressions of counterfactual reasoning (Byrne, 2017). A 
prediction task might serve as a frugal method for peering into users' mental models, but its 
application should be accompanied by a confidence rating and a free response elaboration in 
which the users explain or justify their predictions, or respond to a probe about counterfactuals 
 
Diagramming can be an effective way for a user to convey the understanding to the researcher, 
and it also supports an analytical process in which diagrams are analyzed in terms of their 
proposition content (Cañas, et al., 2003; Johnson-Laird, 1983 Ch. 2). A diagramming task, along 
with analysis of concepts and relations (including causal connections or state transitions) has 
been noted in education as a method for comparing the mental models of students to those of 
experts or their instructor (see Novak and Gowin, 1984); noted in social studies as a method for 
comparing individuals' mental models of social groups (i.e., individuals and their inter-relations; 
Carley and Palmquist, 1992), and in operations research as a method for comparing mental 
models of dynamical systems (see Schaffernicht and Groesser, 2011). 
 
Explicit Explanation improves learning and understanding. This holds for both deliberate self-
motivated self-explanation and also self-explanation that is prompted or encouraged by the 
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instructor. Self-explanation has a significant and positive impact on understanding. Self-
generated deductions and generalizations help learners refine their knowledge (Chi and 
VanLehn, 1991: Chi, et al, 1989, 1994; Chi & Van Lehn, 1991; Lombrozo, 2016; Molinaro & 
Garcia-Madruga, 2011; Rittle-Johnson, 2006). Having learners explain the answers of "experts" 
also enhances the learner's understanding (Calin-Jagerman & Ratner, 2005). 
 
This said, people sometimes overestimate how well they understand complex causal systems. 
This can be corrected by asking the learner to explicitly express their understanding or reasoning 
(Bjork et al., 2013; Chi, et al, 1989; 1991; Fernbach, et al., 2012; Mills & Keil, 2004; O’Reilly, 
Symons, & MacLatchy-Gaudet, 1998; Rittle-Johnson, 2006; Rosenblit & Keil, 2002; VanLehn, 
Ball, & Kowalski, 1990). "ShadowBox Lite" (presented by permission from Devorah Klein; see 
also Klein & borders, 2016) is a specific self-explanation task that is applicable to the XAI 
context, and may provide a quick window into user mental models: It avoids the necessity of 
eliciting and analyzing an extensive recounting of the user’s mental model. In the method, the 
user is presented a question such as "How does a car's cruise control work?" Accompanying the 
question is a proposed explanation. The task for the user is to identify one or more ways in which 
the explanation is good, and ways in which it is bad. After doing this, the participant is shown a 
Good-Bad list that was created a domain expert. The participant's comparison of the lists can 
lead to insights. 
 
 
3.5 Design Considerations 
 
Referencing these four kinds of tasks, and the other tasks listed in Table 1, it is recommended 
that the evaluation of user mental models within the XAI context should employ more than one 
method for eliciting mental models. Performance on any one type of task might not align with 
performance at some other task. For instance, adequacy of a user-generated diagram did not 
match to better performance at a prediction task (see St.-Cyr and Burns, 2002). Performance on a  
simulated industrial process control task can be good and yet the operator’s understanding can be 
limited and even incorrect (see Berry and Broadbent, 1984). 
 
Not all of the participants in a study have to be presented with a mental model elicitation task. 
Indeed, a reasonably sized and representative set of 10 to 12 participants can be presented one or 
more mental model elicitation tasks. If the analysis of the goodness of the mental models aligns 
with measures of performance, then subsequent studies might use performance measures as a 
surrogate for mental model analysis. 
 
 
3.6  Analysis of User Mental Models 
 
An empirically-derived expression of the content or the ebbs and flows that compose a user’s 
mental model must permit evaluation of mental model goodness (i.e., correctness, 
comprehensiveness, coherence, usefulness). For illustrative purposes, Table 3 presents a simple 
example of an Evaluation that is usually based on proposition analysis. Carley and Palmquist 
(1992) provide illustrative examples of propositional coding for transcripts of interviews of 
students by their teachers. The user model developed by Friedman, Forbus and Sherin (2017) is 
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based on propositional encoding of interview transcripts. In this report we illustrate propositional 
analysis using the framework of the ShadowBox Lite Task. Table 6 presents an "expert" 
explanation, although this might just as easily be thought of as an explanation generated by an 
XAI system.  
 
Table 6.  An example of propositional coding using the ShadowBox Lite Task. 
 
The control unit detects the rotation of the drive shaft from a magnet mounted on the drive 
shaft, and from that can calculate how fast the car is going. 
 
The control unit controls an electric motor that is connected to the accelerator linkage. 
 
The cruise control adjusts the engine speed until it is disengaged. 
 
What is right and helpful about this 
explanation? 
 
The cruise control unit has to know how fast 
the car is going. 
 
The cruise control has to control the engine 
throttle or accelerator. 
What is problematic or wrong about this 
explanation? 
 
It seems overly technical, with some concepts 
left unexplained. 
 
I do not think the cruise control detects the 
engine speed. 
 
Results from a number of elicitation tasks will generally be sets of sentences, which can be recast 
as propositions, broken out by the concepts — the relations. The products from a diagramming 
task can also be recast as a set of propositions. The explanation can be decomposed into the 
component concepts, relations and propositions. In the case of the cruise control example, the 
expert's explanation has ten concepts (drive shaft rotation, car speed, etc.) seven relations 
(mounted on, disengage, etc.), and six propositions (e.g., Magnet is mounted on the drive shaft, 
Control unit calculates car speed). 
 
The counts for concepts, relations and propositions can be aggregated and analyzed in a number 
of ways. For instance, one can calculate the percentage of concepts, relations, and propositions 
that are in the user’s explanation that are also in the expert’s explanation. This could suggest the 
completeness of the user’s mental model.  
 
 
3.7 Hypothesis Testing 
 
Based on the model in Figure 1, a primary hypothesis for XAI is that a measure of performance 
is simultaneously a measure of the goodness of user mental models. As our discussion (above) of 
the multi-method approach suggests, this hypothesis is not to be taken for granted. It can be 
empirically investigated to see if it is confirmed. It may be especially revealing to compare 
results from participants who perform the best and participants who perform the worst. 
Comparison of their models, and those with an expert model would affirm the hypothesis that a 
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measure of performance can be simultaneously a measure of the goodness of the user mental 
model. 
 
 
4. Measuring Curiosity 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
There are theoretical and empirical reasons why curiosity could be considered an important 
factor in Explainable AI. One of the most important reasons is that the act of seeking an 
explanation is driven by curiosity. Therefore, it is important that the XAI systems harness the 
power of curiosity. Explanations may promote curiosity and set the stage for the achievement of 
insights and the development of better mental models. 
 
On the other hand, explanations can actually suppress curiosity and reinforce flawed mental 
models.  This can happen in a number of ways: 
 
• An explanation might overwhelm people with details, 
• The XAI system might not allow questions or might make it difficult for the user to pose 
questions, 
• Explanations might make people feel reticent because of their lack of knowledge, 
• Explanations may include too many open variables and loose ends, and curiosity 
decreases when confusion and complexity increase. 
 
For these reasons, the assessment of users' feelings of curiosity might be informative in the 
evaluation of XAI systems. 
 
 
4.2 The Nature of Curiosity 
 
"Epistemic curiosity" is the general desire for knowledge, a motive to learn new ideas, resolve 
knowledge gaps, and solve problems, even though this may entail effortful cognitive activity 
(Berlyne, 1960, 1978; Loewenstein, 1994; see also Litman, 2008; 2010). Stimulus novelty, 
surprisingness, or incongruity, can trigger curiosity. All of these features refer to circumstances 
when information is noted as being missing or incomplete.  
 
Curiosity is also triggered in circumstances where one experiences a "violated expectation" 
(Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991). Violated expectations essentially reflect the discovery that 
events anticipated to be comprehensible are instead confusing – more information and some sort 
of change to one's understanding will be needed to make sense of the event and thus resolve the 
disparity between expectation and outcome. Such situations lead people to engage in effortful 
processing, and motivates them to seek out additional knowledge in order to gain an insight and 
resolve the incongruency (Loewenstein, 1994).  
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This is directly pertinent to XAI. Curiosity is stimulated when learner recognizes that there is a 
gap in their knowledge or understanding. Recognizing a knowledge gap, closing that gap, and 
achieving satisfaction from insight make the likelihood of success from explanations or self-
explanations seem feasible. This leads to the question of how to assess or measure curiosity in 
the XAI context, and what to do with the measurements.  
 
Figure 2 presents a conceptual model of the explanation process from the perspective of the 
learner who is using an XAI system. This diagram shows the role and place of curiosity, noting 
that some learners may not feel curious.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.  A model of the explanation process in the XAI context from the perspective  
of the learner, showing the role of curiosity. 
4.3 Measuring Curiosity in the XAI Context 
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A number of psychometric instruments have names that at first glance make them seem pertinent 
to XAI, such as Frederick's "Cognitive Reflection Test" (2005). But this taps numerical fluency 
and competence. Available scales of curiosity, such as Kashdan's "Curiosity Exploration 
Inventory"(Kashdan, et al., 2004), the Cacioppo "Need for Cognition" scale (Cacioppo, Petty & 
Kao, 1984), and Litman's "I-Type/D-Type Curiosity Scales" (Litman and Jimeson, 2004) 
consider curiosity to be a pervasive style or personality trait. As such, the instruments ask 
questions such as: 
I actively seek as much information as I can in a new situation,  
I feel stressed or worried about something I do not know,  
I like to discover new places to go. 
Such items are barely applicable in the XAI context, in which curiosity is situation or task 
specific, and refers to the workings of computational devices, rather than daily life or 
experiences.   
 
The above discussion of the knowledge gap theory of curiosity implies that the evaluation of 
XAI systems can benefit from basically asking users to identify the triggers that motivated them 
to ask for an explanation. As for the other measurement classes we have discussed, it is valuable 
for the curiosity measurement method to present a "quick window." Table 7 presents a simple 
questionnaire that can be administered to research participants whenever they ask for an 
explanation. 
 
Table 7.  A Curiosity Checklist. 
  
Why have you asked for an explanation?  Check all that apply. 
 
 I want to know what the AI just did. 
 I want to know that I understand this AI system correctly. 
 I want to understand what the AI will do next.  
 I want to know why the AI did not make some other decision. 
 I want to know what the AI would have done if something had been different. 
 I was surprised by the AI’s actions and want to know what I missed. 
 
Responses will be informative with regard to these things:  
(1). Responses may serve as parameters or constraints that the XAI system uses to generate 
explanations.  
(2) Responses may provide a window into aspects of the AI system's operations that need 
explaining.  
(3). Responses may reveal ways in which the AI's explanation method might suppress or inhibit 
curiosity, and 
(4). Responses may make it possible to use depth of curiosity (i.e., more triggers are checked) as  
an independent variable. 
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5 Measuring Trust in the XAI Context 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Trust in automation is of concern in computer science and cognitive systems engineering, as well 
as the popular media (e.g., Chancey et al., 2015; Hoff and Bashir 2015; Fitzhugh, Hoffman & 
Miller, 2011; Hoffman et al., 2009, 2013; Huynh et al., 2006; Kucala, 2013; Lee & See, 2004; 
Merritt and Ilgen, 2008; Merritt et al. 2013, 2015; Naone, 2009; Pop et al. 2015; Shadbolt, 2002; 
Wickens et al., 2015; Woods and Hollnagel 2006).  
 
Some users may take the computer's assertions (data, claims) as valid and true because they 
come from a computer. But other users may require some sort of justification ⎯ empirical reasons 
to believe that the computer's presentations or assertions are valid and true.  Just as there are 
varieties of trusting, there are varieties of negative trusting (mistrust, distrust, etc.). Trust in 
automation can rapidly break down under conditions of time pressure, or when there are 
conspicuous system faults or errors, or when there is a high false alarm rate (Dzindolet et al., 
2003; Madhavan and Wiegmann 2007). The trusting of machines can be hard to reestablish once 
lost.  
 
However trust is measured, in the XAI context, the measurement method must be sensitive to the 
emergence of negative trusting states. XAI systems should enable the user to know whether, 
when, and why to trust and rely upon the XAI system and know whether, when, or why to 
mistrust the XAI and either not rely upon it, or rely on it with caution. People always have some 
mixture of justified and unjustified trust, and justified and unjustified mistrust in computer 
systems. A user might feel positive trust toward an AI system with respect to certain tasks and 
goals and simultaneously feel mistrusting or distrusting when other tasks, goals or situations are 
involved. Indeed, in complex sociotechnical work systems, this is undoubtedly the norm in the 
human-machine relation (Hoffman et al. 2014; Sarter et al. 1997),  
 
Ideally, with experience the user comes to trust the computer with respect to certain tasks or 
goals in certain contexts or problem situations and appropriately mistrusts the computer with 
respect to certain tasks or goals in certain contexts or problem situations. Only if this trusting 
relation is achieved can the user's reliance on the computer be confident (Riley, 1996). 
 
 
5.2 Explanation as Exploration 
 
Trusting of XAI systems will always be exploratory. Active exploration of trusting–relying 
relationships cannot and should not be aimed at achieving single stable states or maintaining 
some decontextualized metrical value, but must be aimed at maintaining an appropriate and 
context-dependent expectation. Active exploration will involve: 
• Verifying the reasons to take the computer's presentations or assertions as true,  
• Enabling the user to understand and anticipate circumstances in which the machine’s 
recommendations will not be trustworthy, and the computer's recommendations should 
not be followed even though they appear trustworthy. 
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• Assessing the situational uncertainty that might affect the probability of favorable 
outcomes. 
• Enabling the user to identify and mitigate Unjustified Trusting and Unjustified 
Mistrusting situations. 
• Enabling the user to discover and appreciate indicators to mitigate the impacts and risks 
of unwarranted reliance, or unwarranted rejection of recommendations, especially in 
time-pressured or information-challenged (too much, too little, or uncertain) situations. 
• Enabling the user to understand and anticipate circumstances (i.e., unforeseen variations 
on contextual parameters) in which the XAI should not be trusted even if it is working as 
it should, and perhaps especially if it is working as it should (Woods 2011). 
 
There are many possible trajectories in this exploration.  For example, a user who is initially 
cautions or skeptical may benefit from a good explanation and move into a region of justified 
trust. Subsequent use of the XAI system, however, may result in an automation surprise. For 
example, a Deep Net might make a misclassification that no human would make. This might 
swiftly move the user into a state of unjustified mistrust, in which the user is skeptical of any of 
the classifications that the Deep Net makes. Following that, the XAI system may provide 
additional explanations and the user may explore the performance of the XAI, converging in the 
region of appropriate trust and reliance. 
 
 
5.3 Trust Measurement Scales 
 
The scientific literature on trust (generally) presents a number of scales for measuring trust. The 
majority of trust scales have been developed for the context of interpersonal trust. We focus on 
scales designed for use in the assessment of human trust in automation. A synopsis of 
representative trust scales is presented in Appendix D. 
 
Minimally, a trust scale can ask two questions: Do you trust the machine's outputs? (trust) and 
Would you follow the machine's advice? (reliance). Indeed, these two items comprise the scale 
developed by Adams, et al. (2003). The scale developed by Johnson (2007) asks only about 
reliance and the rareness of errors.  
 
Some scales for assessing trust in automation are highly specific to particular application 
contexts. For example, the scale developed by Schaefer (2013) refers specifically to the context 
of human reliance on a robot, and thus asks Does it act as part of a team? and Is it friendly? As 
another example, the trust in automation scale developed by Adams, et al. (2003) refers 
specifically to the evaluation of simulations. It asks only two questions, one about trust (Do you 
trust it?) and one about reliance (Are you prepared to rely on it?), although it is noteworthy that 
this is the only scale that has a free response option associated with the two scale item questions. 
 
To be sure, some research on trust in automation is clearly inapplicable to the XAI context.  For 
example, Heerink, et al. (2010) were interested in the acceptance of an assistive/robotic 
technology by the elderly. The questionnaire they utilized has such items as I feel the robot is 
nice, and The robot seems to have real feelings. 
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Montague (2010) presented a study aimed at validating a scale for trust in medical diagnostic 
instruments, but all of the items actually refer to trust in the health care provider and positive 
affect about the provider. Abstracting from that reference context, the other items ask about 
reliability, correctness, precision, and trust. Thus, we see essential similarity to the items in the 
Cahour-Fourzy Scale. 
 
Some scales for assessing trust in automation are highly specific to particular experimental 
contexts. Hence, the items are not applicable to the XAI context, or to any generic trust-in-
automation context. For example, the scale by Dzindolet, et al. (2003) was created for 
application in the study of trust in a system for evaluating terrain in aerial photographs, showing  
images in which there might be camouflaged soldiers. Thus, the hypothetical technology was 
referred to as a "contrast detector." The experiment was one in which the error rate of the 
hypothetical detector was a primary independent variable. As a consequence, the scale items 
refer to trials e.g., How well do you think you will perform during the 200 trials? (Not very well-
Very well), and How many errors do you think you will make during the 200 trials? Some of the 
scale items can be adapted to make them appropriate to the XAI context, but the result of this 
modification is just a few items, which are ones that are already in the Cahour-Fourzy Scale 
(e.g., Can you trust the decisions the [system] will make?) 
 
Of those scales that have been subject to psychometric analysis of reliability, results suggest that 
trust in automation scales can be reliable. Of those scales that have been subject to validity 
analysis, high Cronbach alpha results have been obtained. The report by Jian, et al. (2000) 
illustrates these psychometric analyses. 
 
 
5.4 Recommendations 
 
Looking across the various Scales (see Appendix D), there is considerable overlap, and cross-use 
of the scale items. We have distilled a set of items that might be used in XAI research. This is 
presented in Appendix E. Most of the items are from the Cahour-Fourzy scale (some of which 
are also in the Jian et al. scale), but the recommended scale incorporates items from other scales.  
 
None of the scales that have been reviewed treat trust as a process; they treat it as a static quality  
or target state, that is measured after the research participants have completed their experimental 
tasks. In contrast, it is recommended for the XAI Program that trust measurement be a repeat 
measure. The scale or selected scale items can be applied after individual trials (e.g., after 
individual XAI categorizations or recommendations; after individual explanations are provided, 
etc.). The full scale could be completed part way through a series of experimental trials, and at 
the conclusion of the final experimental trial. Multiple measures taken over time could be 
integrated for overall evaluations of human–machine performance, but episodic measures would 
be valuable in tracking such things as: How do users maintain trust? What is the trend for 
desirable movement toward appropriate trust? 
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6 Measuring Performance 
 
The goal of performance measurement is to determine the degree of success of the human-
machine system at effectively conducting the tasks for which the technology is designed. Based 
on the conceptual model in Figure 1, the key hypotheses are: 
 
• User performance (including measures of joint user-system performance) will improve as 
a result of being given satisfying explanations.	
• User performance will be a function of the qualities of their mental model (e.g., 
correctness, completeness, etc.) 
• User performance may be affected by their level of epistemic trust 
• User performance (that is, reliance) will be appropriate if the user has been able to 
explore the competence envelop of the AI system. 
 
The evaluation of the performance of an XAI system cannot be neatly divorced from the 
evaluation of the performance of the user, or from the performance of the human-machine 
system as a whole.  
 
 
6.1 Performance with Regard to the Primary Task Goals 
 
The AI system will have some primary task goal. This might be to correctly categorize images, 
correctly identify certain kinds of actions in videos, or conduct an emergency rescue operation.  
Performance can be measured in terms of the number of trials on which the user met with 
success, within some pre-specified time period.  In a search-and-rescue use case, work system 
performance might be measured in terms of the number of trials that a user has to work in order 
to reach some pre-determined criterion. Basic measures of efficiency can be applied, expressing 
the ratio of the number of tasks or sub-tasks completed per some period of time.  
 
 
6.2 Performance with Regard to the User 
 
A second aspect of performance measurement is the quality of the performance of the user, such 
as the correctness of the user's predictions of what the AI will do. For these aspects of 
performance, just like performance with regard to primary ask goals, one can measure response 
speed and correctness (hits, errors, misses, false alarms), but in this case the user's predictions of 
the machine outputs. Examination can be made for both typical and atypical cases/situations. 
Additionally, one can measure the correctness and completeness of the user's explanation of the 
machine’s output for cases that are rare, unusual, or anomalous.  
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6.3  Performance with Regard to the Work System 	
 
With regard to performance at the work system level, considerations other than raw efficiency 
come into play (Hoffman & Hancock, 2017; Koopman & Hoffman, 2003). For example, an XAI 
system that drives the work efficiency (say, to deal with data overload issues) may not make for 
a very contented workplace (Merritt, 2011). The complexity of performance at the work system 
level requires analysis based on trade-off functions (Woods & Hollnagel, 2006). 
 
Work system level performance would be reflected when scores on a measure of explanation 
satisfaction correlate highly with evaluations of the goodness of the users' mental models or with 
scores on some other performance measure.   
 
At the work system level, appropriate trust and reliance emerge from the user's experience, 
especially as the user encounters tough cases or cases that fall at the boundary of the work 
system's competence envelope. Appropriateness refers to the fact that mistrust, as well as trust, 
can be justified. Presumably, appropriate reliance (knowing when and when not to rely on the 
system’s outputs) hinges on appropriate trust.  
 
The analysis of work system level performance may employ some measure of controlability, that 
is, the extent to which the human can produce an intended set of outcomes based on given inputs 
or conditions. Analysis may employ some measure of correctability. This is a measure of the 
extent or ease with which the user can correct the machine’s activities so as to make the machine 
outputs better aligned with either objective states of affairs or the user's judgments of what the 
machine should be determining. 
 
The analysis of work system level performance can involve comparing the work productivity of 
the XAI-User work system to productivity in current practice (baseline). A related method is to 
look at learning curves. This involves establishing a metric on a productivity scale, a metric that 
identifies when performance is satisfactory. How many trials of test cases must a user work 
successfully in order to reach that learning criterion? Is the learning rapid?  Why do some people 
take a long time to reach criterion? The advantage of a trials-to-criterion approach to 
measurement is that it could put the different XAI systems on a “level playing field” by making 
the primary measure a derivative of task completion time. A variation on this method is to 
compare performance in this way with performance when the Explanation capability of the XAI 
is somehow hobbled. 
 
Perhaps the most powerful and direct way of evaluating the performance of a work system that 
includes an XAI is to evaluate how easy or difficult it is to get prospective users (stakeholders) to 
adopt the XAI system. In discussing early medical diagnosis systems, van Lent et al (2004) 
stated, “Early on the developers of these systems realized that doctors weren’t willing to accept 
the expert system’s diagnosis on faith” (p. 904), which led to development of the first 
explanation-based AI systems.  Many users may be satisfied with shallow explanations in that 
they will be willing to adopt the system that has “XAI” or may prefer it over another non-XAI 
system when making adoption decisions. Measures of choice behavior were also advocated by 
Adams et al. (2003) as a way of measuring human trust in automation.	
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7. Prospects 
 
Measurement is the foundation of empirical inquiry. As a form of exploration, one of the 
purposes of making measurements is to improve the measures.  We do not regard the ideas and 
methods discussed in this paper as being final.  
 
It was from our own empirical inquiry that emerged our distinction between explanation 
goodness as an a priori evaluation by researchers versus explanation satisfaction as an a 
posteriori evaluation by learners. 
 
We look forward to refinements and extensions of all the ideas presented in this article. 
 
Also foundational to empirical inquiry is a theoretical foundation. The one on which we have 
relied is the conceptual model presented in Figure 1 (above), which references measures of 
explanations, user models, and performance. Other measurable theoretical concepts might be of 
value for XAI research and development. As our discussion suggests, we advocate for a multi-
method approach. Such an approach seems mandated by the fact that the human-XAI interaction 
is a complex cognitive system. 
 
An important measurement topic that we have not addressed is that of "metrics." In modern 
discourse, the word "metric" often carries a dual meaning. One is "measure" or "measurement."  
The other is the notion of some sort of threshold on a measurement scale that is used to make 
evaluations or decisions. In this article we have discussed measurement, not metrics. A simple 
example of the measure-metric distinction might clarify this. If a surgeon specializing in carpal 
tunnel syndrome has a success rate less than 90 percent, he or she might well be in trouble. On 
the other hand, a specialist in spinal surgery with a 90% success rate would be considered  a 
miracle worker. The measurement scale in both contexts is surgery success rate. The metric that 
is laid on that scale depends on the application context (for a fuller discussion, see Hoffman, 
2010). 
 
Certainly XAI research needs metrics to accompany its measures. Is performance superior, 
acceptable, or poor? Is a mental model rich or impoverished? But metrics for these sorts of 
decisions do not emerge directly or easily from theoretical concepts being measured, or the 
operationalzed measures that are being used. The operational definition of a measure tells you 
how to make measurements, not how to interpret them.  Metrics come from policy. 
 
Resolution of this metrics challenge may emerge as more XAI projects are carried through all the 
way to performance evaluation. 
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Appendix A	
 
Explanation Goodness Checklist	
 
 
This checklist is a list of the features that make explanations good, according to the research 
literature.  The reference is to the properties of explanations. 	
 
The intended use context is for researchers or domain experts to provide an independent, a priori 
evaluation of the goodness of explanations that are generated by other researchers or by XAI 
systems.	
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	
 
The explanation helps me understand how the [software, algorithm, tool] works. 
 
YES	  
NO	  
 
The explanation of how the [software, algorithm, tool] works is  satisfying.	
 
YES	  
NO	  
 
The explanation of the [software, algorithm, tool] sufficiently detailed. 	
 
YES	  
NO	  
 
The explanation of how the [software, algorithm, tool] works is sufficiently complete.	
 
YES	  
NO	  
 
The explanation is actionable, that is, it helps me know how to use the [software, algorithm, tool]	
 
YES	  
NO	  
 
The explanation lets me know how accurate or reliable the [software, algorithm] is.	
 
YES	  
NO	  
 
The explanation lets me know how trustworthy the [software, algorithm, tool] is.	
 
YES	  
NO	  
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Appendix B	
 
Materials used in the Evaluation of  the Discriminant Validity 	
of the Explanation Satisfaction Scale	
 
 
How do cell phones provide directions? 
 
Explanation Judged a priori to be  Relatively "Good" 
 
Cell phones use the Global Positioning System of satellites to determine the exact location of the 
phone.  
 
A web-based service (such as Google Maps, Apple Maps, etc.) identifies the phone's coordinates 
along with the desired destination entered by the phone user.  
 
This information is transmitted to a computer, where The Map Service calculates the best route 
based on shortest path, but also traffic and other variables.   
 
The instructions are then sent back to the phone.  
 
The Map Service monitors the phone's location in real-time, and each step is given to the user 
based on the phone’s proximity to the next step (or checkpoint). 
 
 
Explanation Judged a priori to be  Relatively "Bad" 
 
Cell phones can provide good directions because they have really accurate maps on them.   
 
The phone downloads the maps from the internet. 
 
The phone knows where it is and it calculates the shortest route.  
 
It tries to give step-by-step directions. 
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How does automobile cruise control work? 
 
Explanation Judged a priori to be  Relatively "Good" 
 
The speed of the car at the moment you turn on the cruise control is stored in a memory circuit. 
 
The cruise control device reads the car’s speed by a speed sensor that is on the car’s drive shaft. 
 
The cruise control is linked to the engine accelerator, and accelerates the car when it falls below 
the speed you set, such as when you start to go uphill, for example. 
 
It can stop accelerating the car when the car is going downhill, but does not apply the brakes to 
decelerate the car. 
 
The cruise control also senses when the brake pedal has been depressed, and disengages from the 
accelerator. 
 
Explanation Judged a priori to be  Relatively "Bad" 
The vacuum control unit reads the pulse frequency from a magnet mounted on the drive shaft 
to figure out how fast the car is going. 
A bidirectional screw-drive electric motor that is connected to the accelerator linkage 
receives the control signal and transmits it to the throttle. 
When you set the cruise control, the engine detects the engine RPM at that point and tries to 
maintain that engine speed until it is disengaged. 
The cruise control detects the car gear, which it adjusts to allow the engine to maintain a 
constant RPM. 
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How do computers predict hurricanes? 
 
Explanation Judged a priori to be  Relatively "Good" 
 
Computers have a mathematical model of the atmosphere that divides the world into many small 
regions, each just a few square kilometers. 
 
Each region is defined in terms of its air pressure, temperature, winds, and moisture. 
 
The computer calculates what will happen at the boundaries of each region. For example, strong 
winds in one region will move air into an adjacent region.  
 
These calculations must be performed for every boundary between all the regions. This allows 
the prediction of the path a hurricane will take.  
 
Explanation Judged a priori to be  Relatively "Bad" 
 
The computers have a database of all previous hurricanes and the paths that they followed. 
 
Once a hurricane is located, using a satellite image, the computer accesses the database and 
determines the path that was most frequently taken by hurricanes having that initial location. 
 
This process is repeated once every hour, tracking the hurricane as it moves. 
 
The computers can also tell when the winds and rain will impact the land, and that is when the 
hurricane warnings are issued. 
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Appendix C 
 
Explanation Satisfaction Scale 
 
 
1. From the explanation, I understand how the [software, algorithm, tool] works. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
2.  This explanation of how the [software, algorithm, tool] works is satisfying. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
3. This explanation of how the [software, algorithm, tool] works has sufficient detail. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
4. This explanation of how the [software, algorithm, tool] works seems complete. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
5. This explanation of how the [software, algorithm, tool] works tells me how to use it. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
6. This explanation of how the [software, algorithm, tool] works is useful to my goals. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
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7. This explanation of the [software, algorithm, tool] shows me how accurate the [software, 
algorithm, tool] is. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
8. This explanation lets me judge when I should trust and not trust the [software, algorithm, 
tool] 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral 
about it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
 
 	  
XAI	Metrics		 	 p.	41	
APPENDIX D 
 
Synopsis of Representative Trust Scales 
 
 
Cahour-Forzy (2009) Scale; Adams, et al. (2003) Scale  
 
Trust (and distrust) are defined as a sentiment resulting from knowledge, beliefs, emotions and 
other aspects of experience, generating positive or negative expectations concerning the reactions 
of a system and the interaction with it. The scale was developed in the context of  learning to use 
a cruise control system. Trust was analyzed into three factors: reliability, predictability, and 
efficiency. The scale asks users directly whether they are confident in the XAI system, whether 
the XAI system is predictable, reliable, safe, and efficient. 
 
The scale assumes that the participant has had considerable experience using the XAI system. 
Hence, these questions would be appropriate for scaling after a period of use, rather than 
immediately after an explanation has been given and prior to use experience. In the original 
scale, the items are rated on a bipolar scale going from "I agree completely" to "I do not agree at 
all." The items we present below have been slightly modified to fit the general Likert form 
developed for the XAI Explanation Satisfaction Scale. In addition to conforming to psychometric 
standards, consistency of format will presumably make the ratings tasks easier for participants.   
 
1.  What is your confidence in the [tool]? Do you have a feeling of trust in it? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I do not 
trust it at 
all. 
     I trust it 
completely 
 
2.  Are the actions of the [tool] predictable? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is not at all 
predictable. 
     It is 
completely 
predictable. 
 
3.  Is the [tool] reliable? Do you think it is safe? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is not at      It is 
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all safe. completely 
safe. 
 
4.  Is the [tool] efficient at what it does? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
It is not at all 
efficient. 
     It is 
completely 
efficient. 
 
 
Adams, et al. actually developed two scales.  One was for the evaluation of simulations but the 
other was generic, intended for the evaluation of any form of automation. Apart from the item 
about liking, the items show overlap with items in the Cahour-Fourzy Scale. 
 
Each item is accompanied by a bipolar rating scale (e.g., Useful-Not Useful; Reliable-Not 
reliable) on which the participant makes a tick mark on a -5 to +5 delineation. Following the 
Likert items, the Scale asks participants to rank the importance of the six item factors. 
 
Is the automation tool useful? 
How reliable is it? 
How accurately does it work? 
Can you understand how it works? 
Do you like using it? 
How easy is it to use? 
 
Jian, et al. Scale (2000)  
 
Trust is regarded as a trait.  It is analyzed into six factors: Fidelity, loyalty, reliability, security, 
integrity, and familiarity. Factors were developed from cluster analysis on trust-related words. 
This scale is one of the most widely used, especially in the field of human factors.  Indeed, a 
number of other scales have used items, or have adapted scale items, from the Jian, et al. Scale. 
 
The item referencing "integrity" is problematic as the concept that a machine can act with 
integrity is not explicated.  The final item, about familiarity, would not be relevant in the SAI 
context, since the participants' degree of experience with the XAI system will be known 
objectively. 
 
Items 1, 2, 3, and 4 all seem to be asking the same thing. 
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The other items items in this scale show considerable overlap with items in the Cahour-Fourzy 
scale.  However, item 4 is particularly interesting and is does not have a counterpart in the 
Cahour-Fourzy Scale.  We are inclined to recommend that the Jian, et al., item 4 be incorporated 
into the XAI version of the Cahour-Fourzy Scale. 
 
1. The system is deceptive. 
2. The system behaves in an underhanded manner. 
3. I am suspicious of the system's intent, action, or outputs. 
4. I am wary of the system. 
5. The system's actions will have a harmful or injurious outcome. 
6. I am confident in the system. 
7. The system provides security. 
8. The system has integrity. 
9. The system is dependable. 
10. I can trust the system. 
11. I am familiar with the system. 
 
Madsen-Gregor Scale (2000) 
 
Trust is defined as being both affective and cognitive. Trust was analyzed into five factors: 
reliability, technical competence, understandability, faith, and personal attachment. Their focus 
was not just trust in a decision aid but trust in an intelligent decision aid. As such, their scale 
deserves our particular attention. Unfortunately, reports on their work are not accompanied by 
information about the precise method for administering the scale (i.e., whether or not it used a 
Likert method). That said, their results show very high reliabilities (alpha = 0.94) and a factor 
analysis that accounts for about 70% of the variance. 
 
Perceived 
Reliability 
The system always provides the advice I require to make my decision. 
The system performs reliably. 
The system responds the same way under the same conditions at 
different times. 
I can rely on the system to function properly. 
The system analyzes problems consistently. 
Perceived 
Technical 
Competence 
 
The system uses appropriate methods to reach decisions. 
The system has sound knowledge about this type of problem built into 
it. 
The advice the system produces is as good as that which a highly 
competent person could produce. 
The system correctly uses the information I enter. 
The system makes use of all the knowledge and information available to 
it to produce its solution to the problem. 
Perceived 
Understandability 
I know what will happen the next time I use the system because I 
understand how it behaves. 
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I understand how the system will assist me with decisions I have to 
make. 
Although I may not know exactly how the system works, I know how to 
use it to make decisions about 
the problem. 
It is easy to follow what the system does. 
I recognize what I should do to get the advice I need from the system 
the next time I use it. 
Faith 
 
I believe advice from the system even when I don’t know for certain 
that it is correct. 
When I am uncertain about a decision I believe the system rather than 
myself. 
If I am not sure about a decision, I have faith that the system will 
provide the best solution. 
When the system gives unusual advice I am confident that the advice is 
correct. 
Even if I have no reason to expect the system will be able to solve a 
difficult problem, I still feel certain 
that it will. 
Personal 
Attachment 
I would feel a sense of loss if the system was unavailable and I could 
not longer use it. 
I feel a sense of attachment to using the system. 
I find the system suitable to my style of decision making. 
I like using the system for decision making. 
I have a personal preference for making decisions with the system. 
 
It is noteworthy that the Scale refers to understandability but does not explicitly reference trust.  
 
Upon close examination, it seems that the reliability factor has some redundant items. The 
factors titled "perceived technical competence" and "perceived understandability" might be 
interpreted as referencing the user's mental model of the system. For example, the item Even if I 
have no reason to expect the system will be able to solve a difficult problem, I still feel certain 
that it will clearly is asking about the user's mental model. Indeed, the Madsen-Gregor Scale as a 
whole can be understood as referring as much to evaluating the user's mental model as it does to 
trust.  The mere fact that this distinction is fuzzy is a testament to the notion that XAI evaluation 
must have measures of both trust and of mental models, since the two are causally related. 
 
One can question the appropriateness of referring to a "faith" factor. Items in this factor seem to 
refer to reliance and uncertainty. One can question the appropriateness of referring to a "personal 
attachment" factor rather than a "liking" factor.  
 
As with other Scales, multiple interpretations are possible.  For instance, the Madsen-Gregor 
item I believe advice from the system even when I don’t know for certain that it is correct asks 
essentially the same thing as the Cahour-Fourzy item I am confident in the tool; it works well. 
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A number of individual items are of interest, such as "It is easy to follow what the system does" 
and "I recognize what I should do to get the advice I need from the system." These seem to 
reference usability. Up to this point, issues of XAI system learnability and usability have not 
been considered in the XAI Program. 
 
Merritt Scale (2011)  
 
Trust is regarded as an emotional, attitudinal judgement of the degree to which the user can rely 
on the automated system to achieve his or her goals under conditions of uncertainty. Trust was 
initially broken into three factors: belief, confidence, and dependability. Factor Analysis revealed 
two other factors: propensity to trust and liking. The scale was evaluated in an experiment in 
which participants conducted a baggage screen task using a fictitious automated weapon detector 
in a luggage screening task. Chronbach’s alpha ranged from a = .87 to a = .92.  
 
Items in this Scale are all similar to items in the Cahour-Fourzy Scale. 
 
1. I believe the system is a competent performer. 
2. I trust the system. 
3. I have confidence in the advice given by the system. 
4. I can depend on the system. 
5. I can rely on the system to behave in consistent ways. 
6. I can rely on the system to do its best every time I take its advice. 
 
Schaefer Scale (2013) 
 
This scale was developed in the context of human-robot collaboration. Thus, trust was said to 
depend on both machine performance and team collaboration. Trust was analyzed into two 
factors: ability and performance. This scale is unique in that it is long and has a format different 
from all the other scales. Specifically the participant is asked to estimate the amount of time that 
the machine (in the study, a robot) would show each of a number of possible behaviors.  In this 
scale format, some items are troublesome.  For example, if the machine acts consistently, what is 
the point of asking about the percentage of time that it asks consistently? Many of the items 
anthropomorphize the machine (robot) and do so in ways that seem inappropriate for the XAI 
application (e.g., "know the difference between friend and foe," "be supportive," "be 
responsible," "be conscious"). For example, the point of XAI is to communicate richly and 
meaningfully with the participant. Thus, asking about the percentage of time that the XAI 
"openly communicates" or "clearly communicates" seems redundant to the evaluation of 
Explanation Satisfaction.  In the list below, we place in the left those items that seem appropriate 
to XAI and in the right those that do not. The items in the left align fairly well to items in the 
Cahour-Fourzy Scale. One of these items "Perform a task better than a novice human user" is 
particularly interesting and might be added into the Cahour-Fourzy Scale. 
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What percentage of the time will this machine (robot)… 
Act consistently  
Function successfully  
Have errors 
Perform a task better than a novice human user  
Possess adequate decision-making capability  
Perform exactly as instructed 
Make sensible decisions  
Tell the truth  
Perform many functions at one time  
Follow directions 
Incompetent  
Dependable  
Reliable  
Predictable  
 
Protect people  
Act as part of the team  
Malfunction  
Clearly communicate  
Require frequent maintenance  
Openly communicate  
Know the difference between friend and foe  
Provide feedback  
Warn people of potential risks in the 
environment  
Meet the needs of the mission 
Provide appropriate information 
Communicate with people  
Work best with a team 
Keep classified information secure  
Work in close proximity with people  
Considered part of the team  
Friendly   
Pleasant  
Unresponsive   
Autonomous   
Conscious  
Lifelike  
A good teammate 
Led astray by unexpected changes in the 
environment 
 
 
Singh, et al. Scale (1993) 
 
This scale presupposes a context in which the participant is evaluating a device with which they 
have prior experience or have general familiarity with (ATMs, medical devices, etc.). Trust was 
defined as an attitude toward commonly encountered automated devices that reflect a potential 
for complacency.  Trust was analyzed into five factors: confidence, reliance, trust,  safety, 
complacency. Since the scale merges trust and reliance, it presupposes prior experience and 
would not be appropriate for use when a user is first learning to use an XAI.  For these reasons, 
we feel that this scale is not appropriate for use in the XAI context. Items that might be modified 
to make them appropriate reference factors that are already covered in the Cahour-Fourzy Scale 
(i.e., trust, reliance). 
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Factor 1: Confidence 
1. I think that automated devices used in medicine, such as CT scans and ultrasound, provide 
very reliable medical diagnosis.  
2. Automated devices in medicine save time and money in the diagnosis and treatment of 
disease. 
3. If I need to have a tumor in my body removed, I would choose to undergo computer-aided 
surgery using laser technology because it is more reliable and safer than manual surgery. 
4. Automated systems used in modern aircraft, such as the automatic landing system, have made 
air journeys safer. 
Factor 2: Reliance 
1. ATMs provide a safeguard against the inappropriate use of an individual's bank account by 
dishonest people.  
2. Automated devices used in aviation and banking have made work easier for both employees 
and customers. 
3. Even though the automatic cruise control in my car is set at a speed below the speed limit, I 
worry when I pass a police radar speed trap in case the automatic control is not working 
properly. 
Factor 3: Trust 
1. Manually sorting through card catalogues is more reliable than computer-aided searches for 
finding items in a library.  
2. I would rather purchase an item using a computer than have to deal with a sales representative 
on the phone because my order is more likely to be correct using the computer.  
3. Bank transactions have become safer with the introduction of computer technology for the 
transfer of funds. 
Factor 4: Safety 
1. I feel safer depositing my money at an ATM than with a human teller.  
2. I have to tape an important TV program for a class assignment. To ensure that the correct 
program is recorded, I would use the automatic programming facility on my VCR rather than 
manual taping. 
 
Wang, et al. Scale (2009) 
 
This scale was used to evaluate trust in a hypothetical "combat identification system" that 
participants used in a simulated task. All of the items were taken form or adapted from the Jian, 
et al. Scale. The reliability of the decisions generated by the hypothetical decision aid was a 
primary independent variable, in an effort to study response bias inducted by automation 
reliability. The scale items are reported in the paper, but not the format for the scale (e.g., was it 
a Likert scale?). Some items are context specific (e.g., The aid provides security; The blue light 
indicates soldiers").  What is noteworthy about some of the items is that they refer explicitly to 
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deception and mistrust. Other items in the Wang, et al., Scale refer to trust and reliability and are 
covered by items in the Cahour-Fourzy Scale.   
 
The aid is deceptive. 
The aid behaves in an underhanded (concealed) manner. 
I am suspicious of the aid’s outputs. 
I am wary of the aid. 
The aid’s action will have a harmful or injurious outcome. 
I am confident in the aid. 
The aid provides security. 
The aid is dependable. 
The aid is reliable. 
I can trust the aid. 
I am familiar with the aid. 
I can trust that blue lights indicate soldiers. 
I can trust that red lights indicate terrorists. 
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Appendix E 
 
Trust Scale Recommended for XAI 
 
 
This Trust Scale asks users directly whether they are confident in the XAI system, whether the 
XAI system is predictable, reliable, efficient, and believable. 
 
The scale assumes that the participant has had considerable experience using the XAI system. 
Hence, these questions would be appropriate for scaling after a period of use, rather than 
immediately after an explanation has been given and prior to use experience. 
 
A majority of the items are adapted from the Cahour-Fourzy Scale (2009), just as they have been 
adapted for use in other scales (e.g., Jian, et al.). In the original scale, the items are rated on a 
bipolar scale going from I agree completely to I do not agree at all. We have modified the items 
to fit the general Likert form developed for the XAI Explanation Satisfaction Scale. In addition 
to conforming to psychometric standards, this consistency of format will presumably make the 
ratings tasks easier for participants.   
 
Item 6 was adapted from the Jian, et al. Scale, item 7 was adapted from the Schaefer Scale, and 
item 8 was adapted from the Madsen-Gregor Scale. 
 
We can assert that the Recommended Scale is reliable based on these two facts: 
(1). The majority of the items in this Recommended Scale essentially overlap with items in the 
Jian, et al. (2000) scale, which was shown empirically to be highly reliable.  
(2) Items in the Recommended Scale bear overall semantic similarity to items in the Madsen-
Gregor-Scale, and that scale too was also shown to have high reliability coefficients.   
 
We can assume that the Recommended Scale has content validity Given the essential overlap of 
items in the Recommended Scale with items in most of the existing scales, we can safely assume 
that the Recommended Scale has content validity. 
 
1.  I am confident in the [tool]. I feel that it works well. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
2.  The outputs of the [tool] are very predictable. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
3.  The tool is very reliable.  I can count on it to be correct all the time. 
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5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
4. I feel safe that when I rely on the [tool] I will get the right answers. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
5.  The [tool] is efficient in that it works very quickly. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
6. I am wary of the [tool]. (adopted from the Jian, et al. Scale and the Wang, et al. Scale) 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
7. The [tool] can perform the task better than a novice human user. (adopted from the Schaefer 
Scale) 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 
 
8. I like using the system for decision making. 
 
5 4 3 2 1 
I agree strongly  I agree somewhat I’m neutral about 
it 
I disagree 
somewhat 
I disagree 
strongly 
 	
